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Measuring financial market integration over the long run:
Is there a U-shape?
June 2011
Abstract
Using long time series for sovereign bond markets of fifteen industrialized economies from
1875 to 2009, I find that financial market integration by the end of the 20th century was
higher than in earlier periods and exhibited a J -shaped trend with a trough in the 1920s.
The main reason for the higher financial integration seen today is the recent extensive
globalization. Around the turn of the 20th century, countries frequently drifted apart.
Conversely, in recent years, the bond markets of most countries have moved together.
Both policy variables and the global market environment play a role in explaining the time
variation in integration, while “unexplained” changes in the overall level of country risk
are also empirically important. My methodology, based on principal components analysis,
is immune to outliers and accounts for global and country-specific shocks and, hence, can
capture trends in financial integration more accurately than standard techniques such as
simple correlations.
1 Introduction
The extent of international financial integration has important implications for economic theory
and policy debates. The relative degree of financial integration during the two capital market
booms, before World War I and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, remains
subject to disagreement. Typical measures of integration include proxies for intensity of legal
restrictions on cross-border capital flows, price-based criteria, and quantity-based criteria.1
Quinn (2003) argues that financial markets were more integrated during the pre-WWI era,
1Price-based criteria include various interest parity conditions or the purchasing power parity condition,
while quantity-based criteria are based on the volume of capital flows and the stocks of external assets and
liabilities. See Kose et al. (2009) for a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of various measures.
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whereas Mauro et al. (2002) find that they are more integrated post-Bretton Woods. Others,
including Obstfeld and Taylor (2003; 2004) and Goetzmann et al. (2005), argue that financial
markets demonstrate a U-shape and hence an equal amount of integration before 1914 and
after 1971. It is important to know which period has been associated with a higher degree
of capital market integration because these periods differ drastically in terms of the economic
environment and policies.
I argue that mixed results in the literature are a result of studies using different method-
ologies and the failure to differentiate between global or country shocks. To address these
concerns, I propose a systematic methodology based on the method of principal components
that has several advantages. First, it accounts for several dimensions of integration includ-
ing market comovement and segmentation, within a straightforward statistical methodology
that is widely used in microeconomic research. Second, it is robust to the presence of outliers
or heavy-tailed distributions. Third, the current method is robust to the choice of a refer-
ence country (such as the United States or Great Britain). Fourth, the methodology has a
clear theory-based interpretation. Finally, using this method I was able to account for global
shocks while several other methodologies spuriously interpret large global shocks as integration
because common global shocks make financial variables move together.
The focus of this paper is on financial markets integration from the prospective of investors
in financial assets or financial arbitrageurs, as opposed to integration of commodity markets or
markets for real assets. Standard no-arbitrage theory predicts that, when investors in financial
markets are neutral to exchange (or currency) risk and market frictions are negligible, free
international capital flows (financial arbitrage) result in the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP)
condition. This result implies that similar assets in different locations have the same expected
nominal rate of return regardless of exposure to the exchange risk. However, literature has
accumulated abundant evidence of non-negligible exchange, default, and political risk across
countries and over time. Further, these risks may result in persistent and volatile risk premia
and hinder the ability of countries to tap into international capital markets. If these risks
depend on, or are correlated with, legal restrictions to capital flows or the underdevelopment
of financial markets, international arbitrage opportunities may also be limited. These combined
factors reduce financial integration.
1
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I do not expect to find perfect capital mobility anywhere in history given all the evidence
from the literature. Rather, I intend to concentrate on a weaker notion of integration charac-
terized by smaller and more stabile risk premia that would result in a higher comovement (but
not necessarily equalization) of a country’s financial returns.2 Even if a greater comovement
is driven by common global shocks, the fact that such shocks propagate across countries and
these shocks are frequent might also be a sign of greater interconnection between individual
economies (Bordo et al., 2001). I also verify how comovement of returns has changed over time
conditional on time-varying determinants of the risk premia.
My empirical methodology is based on principal component analysis (PCA). The PCA is a
non-parametric empirical methodology used to reduce the dimensionality of data and describe
common features of a set of economic variables. This method transforms the observed data
vectors into new variables referred to as components, which are are linear combinations of
the original data that maximize variance.3 The goal of the method is to capture most of the
observed variability in the data in a lower-dimensional object and, thereby, filter out noise.
Often, a single component summarizes most of the variation of the original data.
I argue that the “first” principal component (with the components ordered according to how
much of the data-variation they capture) has a natural interpretation when the PCA is applied
to a comparable series (prices, returns, etc.) across markets. When the observed economic
variables have a high signal-to-noise ratio, which would be the case under economic integration,
a few principal components with larger variance would capture the dynamics that will be
informative of the extent of market integration. This result should also be consistent with the
standard no-arbitrage theory that implies if the majority of countries are integrated into the
world financial markets, their interest rates move together with the world rate. The proportion
of total variation in individual returns explained by the first principal component serves as an
index of integration. I estimate the index of integration over the long-run dynamically via
rolling windows. Using the dynamic PCA in the context of market integration is an innovation
of this paper as it reveals important trends in integration and country- or group-specific shocks
2Clarida and Taylor (1997) demonstrate that the nominal interest rate differential is stationary even if we
allow for deviations from the simple efficient markets hypothesis due to risk premia and deviations from rational
expectations if the resulting deviations from UIP are themselves stationary.
3See Jolliffe (2002) for a more detailed treatment of the PCA.
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hidden when a single estimate corresponding to the entire period is reported.4 Furthermore,
using individual country weights (called “loadings” in PCA) on the first principal component,
I developed two complementary indices of segmentation, which summarize country or group-
specific effects, to investigate possible reasons for the changing degree of integration.
Being a price-based measure, the PCA-based index of integration has several practical
advantages. The first advantage is the reliance on historic price data, which has a better
quality compared to the volume of capital flows used to construct quantity-based measures
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). Second, issues that plague price-based measures over the short-
term would not affect the results as much when we look at very long time periods.5 Finally,
the long historic context allows researchers to compare the relative degree of integration in the
present and during previous periods rather than to test for “full integration” or “no integration”
which necessitates the choice of some questionable benchmarks and creates difficulty when the
absolute values of these measures have to be interpreted.
My primary data are monthly series of sovereign bond yields from 1875 to 2009 available in
the Global Financial Database (GFD). The sample includes 15 economies whose sovereign debt
was continuously traded in a major international financial center (London) and was available
in other locations as early as the mid-19th century.6 Historically, sovereign bonds have been
the most actively traded segment of financial markets.7 In contrast to the stock market indices,
the characteristics of the underlying instruments in bond markets (maturity, coupon payments,
the identity of the issuer, etc.) are similar across countries and over time. This comparability
makes these data attractive for long-term study of the dynamics of financial integration. I prefer
using bonds payable in national currency and do not convert the data into a single currency or
constant prices because I take the prospective of an investor in international financial markets
4Due to problems with interpretation, the PCA has not found a widespread application in the integration
literature. To best of my knowledge, all existing studies do not explore the dynamic integration pattern.
5If two countries share the same technologies, tastes and endowments asset prices in these locations might
be identical even with the most stringent barriers to capital flows (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, p. 46). Such
“coincidence” is not likely to persist over the long-run however. Separately, the recent research on the UIP
condition in developed countries surveyed by Alper et al. (2009) finds unfavorable evidence mostly at short
horizons.
6The largest sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The motivation for
this sample is described in Section 5.1.
7Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) also stress that long-term bond yields are most appropriate for a study of the
international capital mobility because they are most directly related to the financing costs for capital investments.
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and want to analyze all possible reasons for changes in comovement (currency and country
risk, cross-border frictions, and other limits to arbitrage). Prior to World War II, the database
reports multiple bond series, while the unified series became available from the 1920s onward.
I carefully select those early bond series that are most comparable with the subsequent series
in order to minimize breaks and make the long-term series consistent.
I estimate the index of integration over 1875–2009 using a relatively wide rolling window
of 156 months (13 years), which makes the results relatively immune to short-term noise and
to conditional heteroskedasticity in returns. Over the very long-term, the evidence points to
higher financial market integration at the end of the 20th century compared to earlier periods.
Therefore, the integration followed a J -shaped trend with a trough as early as the 1920s rather
than a U-shape as documented by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and others. This pattern is
also confirmed by time-series regression analysis. According to the indices of segmentation,
around the turn of the 20th century countries frequently drifted apart while in the recent
years the most countries move together. This uncovers the changed nature of shocks prevalent
in the two eras of globalization. Finally, I find that both policy variables (average inflation,
government deficit, and, in Bretton Woods period, the exchange-rate regime) and the global
market environment (proxied by average trade openness) play a role in explaining the time
variation in the index of integration, while “unexplained” changes in overall level of country
risk are also empirically important.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 presents a smoothed estimate of the index of integration
over 130 years. As illustrated in this figure, and consistent with the literature, the dynamics
of integration have not been even throughout history. Specifically, integration grew from the
late 19th century up to 1914, when World War I began. Following that period, the trend in
integration turned negative and reached a historic low around the time of the Great Depression
in the 1930s. The partial recovery of international financial linkages in the 1920s is invisible in
the graph since it was short-lived. After World War II, the trend in integration turned positive
and continued its upward crawl almost uninterrupted to a historic high by the end of the 20th
century. It is clear that integration reached levels comparable to the Gold Standard era as early
as the late 1960s. This evidence is consistent with the view expressed by Kose et al. (2009) that
evaluating integration based on the de jure government restrictions on capital flows may be
4
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misleading because capital controls could be avoided, as was the case in the 1960s, which was
characterized by rapid expansion of trade, offshore banking, and Eurocurrency markets.8 This
result casts a serious doubt on the Macroeconomic Trilemma paradigm: clearly, during the
Bretton-Woods era of tight controls some capital flows were possible in spite of fixed exchange
rates and monetary policy that was designed to keep rates fixed.
[insert Figure 1 here]
My measure of integration does not rely on any particular underlying model; nevertheless
this measure has a clear theory-based interpretation. In the case of countries’ interest rates,
the first principal component may naturally be interpreted as the “world” rate. Figure 2
illustrates the individual country yields used in this study with the values on the left axis and
the estimated world return on the right axis. This figure demonstrates that the world return
captures the dynamics of individual rates remarkably well while it is not affected by country-
specific shocks. This is because the world return uses country weights based on features of the
data and not subjectively asserted by the researcher. This proxy also reflects the continuously
changing individual counties’ influence on the world return. For example, when a country
shuts down its capital markets, its domestic financial market behavior diverges from the world
market. First principal component will immediately capture this decoupling, which will show
up as a lower loading that corresponds to this country.
[insert Figure 2 here]
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses related
literature. In Section 3, I lay out a conceptual framework that motivates the empirical analysis
and helps interpret the results. Section 4 discusses the methodology used to quantify integra-
tion in various markets. Section 5 describes the data and the pattern of integration. Section 6
offers some explanations of the observed pattern. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
8 While Eichengreen (1996, pp 120-122) cites some evidence that the capital controls still mattered in
the 1960s to keep covered interest differential relatively large, he stresses that with the relaxing of current-
account restrictions it became easy to over- and under-invoice trade and channel money abroad. The growth
of multinational corporations also helped undermine capital controls. Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) textbook
discusses some anecdotal evidence. Eurodollars were introduced in the 1950s to support the needs of the growing
international trade; after the late 1950s offshore markets for other currencies emerged when these currencies
became increasingly convertible. Official regulations and political concerns further contributed to growth of
Eurocurrency trading and undermined the official controls.
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2 Historic integration patterns: Evidence in the literature
Researchers have not yet reached an agreement regarding the extent of international integration
in the 1990s-2000s compared to the first era of globalization, prior to World War I. Quinn
(2003), Bordo and Flandreau (2003), and Bordo and Murshid (2006) argue that financial
markets were more integrated during the pre-WWI era. Quinn (2003) compiles an indicator
of official restrictions on international financial transactions from 1890–1999. He documents
that virtually all (industrialized and developing) countries were almost completely open by
the late 19th century and concludes that financial globalization was deeper in 1890-1913 than
subsequently. Bordo and Flandreau (2003) argue that the recent integration is largely an
advanced country phenomenon, whereas it was relatively easier for “periphery” countries to
borrow in “core” countries currencies before 1914.9 Finally, Bordo and Murshid (2006) focus
on the transmission of shocks and currency crises and find that financial shocks were more
globalized before 1914 compared to the present.
In contrast, Bordo et al. (1999b, 2001), Mauro et al. (2002), and Quinn and Voth (2008)
find that the markets are more integrated post-Bretton Woods. Bordo et al. (1999b) point out
that the globalization of commodities and financial markets is deeper and broader now, if we
take into account such impediments as transportation costs, the degree of contract enforcement,
government trade barriers, and information asymmetries. While in the past long-term capital
flows were large relative to the size of the world economy, the commodities trade was much
smaller relative to countries’ outputs. Today’s trade and direct investments span previously
“non-traded” sectors including services, retail trade, and public utilities. Bordo et al. (2001)
analyze the 120-year history of financial (banking, currency, and twin) crises and find that these
incidences are more frequent today due to unprecedented capital mobility (especially of short-
term capital) and higher risk-taking aided by modern financial safety nets. Today’s prevalence
of more disruptive twin crises also points on the larger breadth of financial integration; however,
in general, today’s crises are not more severe in terms of length and output losses.10 Mauro et
9Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) also stress large (compared to the size of their economies) external liabilities of
the “periphery” countries then.
10Kose et al. (2005) provide the evidence that the common factor explains a larger fraction of output, consump-
tion, and investment volatility of the Group of Seven countries compared in the globalization period 1986–2003
than in the Bretton Woods period 1960–1972.
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al. (2002) study bond market correlations and Quinn and Voth (2008) focus on stock market
correlations and find that, from the early 1990s, these correlations are at the historic high,
even compared to the pre-World War I period—the period of zero restrictions according to the
Quinn’s capital restrictions measure. Mauro et al. attribute sharp changes in bond spreads to
global events in the 1990s and to country-specific events in 1870–1913.
The third group, represented by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003; 2004) and Goetzmann et
al. (2005), argues that there is a U-shape and hence an equal amount of integration before
1914 and after 1970. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003; 2004) arrive at this conclusion using a variety
of price and quantity criteria of integration. Goetzmann et al. (2005) confirm the U-shape
in the historic stock markets correlations; however, they also document the changing number
of equity markets, which defines investment opportunity set. While they find that today the
average correlation among the available markets is lower, the number of world markets available
for the international investor is larger. This explains why we do not see a larger comovement
of today’s stock markets with average correlations.11
The examples above demonstrate that, methodologically, the existing literature mostly
draws conclusions about financial integration from one or a few metrics of integration. Re-
searchers seem to lack a uniform measure of integration (an “integration index”) that is theory-
based and transparently and clearly reflects the extent and dynamics of integration in a particu-
lar market. One solution suggested by Goetzmann et al. (2005) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003)
is to explore the changes in time-series correlations of returns across countries over time. Obst-
feld and Taylor admit, however, that a higher correlation among markets might be the result
of common shocks among a group of countries and not necessarily evidence of globalization.
To overcome this problem Obstfeld and Taylor (2003; 2004) investigate the pattern of financial
integration based on a combination of price and quantity criteria. In my view, it is important
to pursue a more systematic study—more in spirit of Obstfeld and Taylor (2003; 2004)—to
quantify integration, explore its dynamics, and capture episodes of market segmentation.
11Several papers provide indirect evidence that financial integration was high both in the past and today.
Clemens and Williamson (2000) study historical British capital flows and find that both prior World War I and
recently integration of capital markets was sufficient to eliminate the influence of international market failures
on capital flows. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that financial development is positively correlated with a
country’s openness to trade, both in the beginning of the century (1913) and towards the end of the century
(the late 1990s).
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3 Conceptual Issues
The financial literature has a long tradition of measuring financial markets integration (or
market efficiency) by comparing returns on similar financial assets. The standard no-arbitrage
theory predicts that free international capital flows result in the UIP condition between ex-
pected rates of return of two countries, expressed in a common currency, such that 1 + it,k =
(1 + i∗t,k)S
e
t,k/St or, as log-approximation, it,k − i∗t,k = ∆ekst where it,k and i∗t,k are the nominal
interest rate on domestic asset (in domestic currency) and foreign asset (in foreign currency),
St and S
e
t,k are today’s and expected future spot exchange rate k periods ahead, quoted as
the domestic-currency price of one unit of foreign currency, and ∆ekst ≡ set+k − st (with the
lower-case exchange rates being in logs). Under the UIP, a domestic investor’s exchange risk
exposure is uncovered.12 By extension, in the multi-country case, perfect capital mobility
would preclude local asset prices to deviate from global prices.
The international macroeconomics literature has established that “frictions” associated
with national borders are the reason for having lower integration in the recent decades than
what we would expect in theory.13 Explicit government trade and capital controls, sovereign
and default risk, information asymmetries, poor institutions, and high price of physical capital
are examples of such cross-border frictions (see Wei 2000; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Alfaro et
al., 2008; Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) conclude that the changes in
quantity and price indicators of financial integration over the last 150 years have been caused
by changes in barriers to international capital flows (or changes in arbitrage opportunities)
over time, not by the structural changes within economies. Obstfeld and Taylor and also
Eichengreen (1996) further emphasize the dramatic political, economic and intellectual changes
over the course of the century and stress the political economy considerations behind the
changes in integration over time in accordance with the Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma.
12This “basic” UIP condition assumes that the number of international investors is sufficiently large, the
investors are exchange-risk-neutral, transaction costs are negligible, and assets located in different countries are
identical with respect to liquidity, maturity, political and default risk. UIP hypothesis can be empirically tested
by estimating a regression ∆kst = st+k− st = α+β(it,k− i∗t,k) +ut+k and testing the joint hypothesis of α = 0,
β = 1, and ut+k is orthogonal to the information available at t. Such test assumes the rational expectations by
which st+k = E(st+k|It) + ut+k and the forecast error ut+k is independent of the information at time t.
13The manifestations of low international financial integration include home bias in equity holdings (French
and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995), high correlation between country savings and investment (Feldstein
and Horioka, 1980), lower cross-country consumption correlations than output correlations (Backus et al., 1992),
lack of flows of capital from rich to poor economies (Lucas, 1990).
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According to the Trilemma hypothesis, growing political tensions at home pushed national
governments toward a greater macroeconomic activism in the 1920s–1930s compared to prior
to World War I, when government policies were subject to maintaining the “rules of the game”
of international Gold Standard arrangement.
Consequently, the UIP with risk is a natural benchmark to study the relationship be-
tween the degree of international financial integration and economic policies, fundamentals,
and international market environment, all of which determine the “risk” for an international
investor. Theoretically, the deviations from the basic UIP condition could be attributed to the
non-rationality of market expectations, risk aversion of investors (by which investors would de-
mand a premium for holding assets they consider risky), existence of transaction costs, market
frictions, government interventions, and limits to speculation (investors engage in arbitrage
only if the excess return per unit of risk is large enough). Retaining the assumption of rational
expectations, the deviation from the basic UIP can be represented as:
it,k − i∗t,k −∆ekst = ρt (1)
where ρt is the time-varying risk premium (broadly defined). Risk premium is positive if
domestic interest rate is higher than the level predicted by the UIP.14 To see various sources of
the risk premium consider some options for an international investor from 1880–1913.15 The
investor could purchase the Danish 3.5% Internal Debt Loan of 1887 denominated in kronor
floated in Copenhagen and paying it,k, the Danish 4% Loan of 1912 in British pounds floated
in Copenhagen and paying i£t,k, the Danish 3% Gold Loan of 1897 in pounds floated in London
and paying i£,Lont,k , or the British consol bond in pounds floated in London and paying i
∗
t,k.
Using this notation, the equation (1) can be decomposed into:
it,k − i∗t,k = ∆ekst + (it,k − i£t,k −∆ekst) + (i£,Lont,k − i∗t,k) + (i£t,k − i£,Lont,k ) (2)
= ∆ekst + ρ
E
t + ρ
D
t + ρ
P
t (3)
14With the failure of the rational expectations assumption, the expected depreciation term ∆ekst in (1) could be
represented by the actual exchange-rate change ∆kst plus a forecast error νt+k that depends on the information
exploitable at time t. Sarno and Taylor (2002) stress the importance of risk premia, expectations, and the use
of survey data in testing of the UIP. See Alper et al. (2009) for a recent survey.
15The following historical example follows similar UIP decomposition in Frankel (1992) and Alper et al. (2009)
with the information on Danish bonds obtained from Bordo and Flandreau (2003).
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The term it,k − i£t,k − ∆ekst reflects the exchange risk ρEt because the assets it represents are
identical in terms of the issuer and the jurisdiction (Denmark) but different by the currency
denomination. The assets in the term i£,Lont,k − i∗t,k differ by the issuer country but both are in
the foreign currency and floated in foreign market from the prospective of Denmark. This term
represents the default risk ρDt . The assets in the third term i
£
t,k−i£,Lont,k differ by the jurisdiction
but are the same in terms of currency (the pound) and the issuer (Denmark), reflecting the
political risk ρPt of shifting the capital across borders. The nominal interest differential then
equals to an anticipated change in the exchange rate plus the sum of the exchange risk ρEt , the
default risk ρDt , and the political risk ρ
P
t . Hence, in general, risk-neutral investors (who care
only about expected returns) would ask for the country-risk premium ρDt +ρ
P
t , and risk-averse
investors would in addition require the exchange-risk premium ρEt .
16
One approach to the study of financial integration within the UIP-with-risk paradigm is to
identify the degree of integration with the risk premium and analyze its time-series pattern and
properties (see Lothian, 2002 for a group of industrial countries over the long-term; Holtemo¨ller,
2005 for the EU accession countries). The second approach consists primarily of country
studies and relates the total risk premium or its components to macroeconomic fundamentals,
transaction costs, or monetary policy (see Alper et al., 2009 for the survey).17 As Obstfeld
and Taylor (2004) stress, we always face the problem that “every test [for capital mobility] is
usually a matter of degree,” and the choice of benchmark to which today’s integration should
be compared is difficult. Furthermore, the data availability often poses a challenge to the direct
studies of the UIP over the long-term. Considering this, I combine these approaches to face
the challenges experienced by previous researchers. Similarly to the first literature, I study the
deviations from UIP indirectly by looking at comovement of the nominal returns over time.
I also follow the second strand of literature and verify how the comovement of returns
changed over time, conditional on time-varying determinants of risk premia. In the classical
Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell trade theory, trade and finance are substitutes since trade integration
16In case of government bonds, ρDt and ρ
P
t represent the “country risk” as defined by Frankel (1992) which
captures “all barriers to integration of financial markets across national boundaries: transactions costs, infor-
mation costs, capital controls, tax laws that discriminate by country of residence, default risk, and risk of future
capital controls.”
17Alternatively, the capital asset pricing models (CAPM) suggest that only non-diversifiable “systematic” risk
can be interpreted as a risk premium. According to the CAPM literature, if exchange and country risks cannot
be (completely) diversified they are the part of the systematic risk and hence would explain return differentials.
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equalizes factor prices reducing, or altogether eliminating, the incentives for capital to flow
into capital-scarce countries. However empirical evidence, supported by alternative theories,
suggests that international capital flows often follow trade patterns, making them complements
(see for example Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004).18 Rose and Spiegel (2004) argue that creditors
might systematically lend more to countries with which they share closer trade links if the
threat of trade sanctions could effectively prevent sovereign default as in the “default penalties”
model of Bulow and Rogoff (1989).19 The complementarity can also be explained by goods
or asset market frictions (trade costs, information asymmetry) as in the models of Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000) and Martin and Rey (2004). Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) stress the role
of scale economies emerging from market size and argue that a large volume of trade between
two countries would make the foreign exchange market more liquid and more efficient and thus
reduce transaction costs for financial investments. In the model with financial frictions by
Antras and Caballero (2009) and in political economy “interest groups” theory by Rajan and
Zingales (2003), both trade and capital flows become market mechanisms to promote financial
development and correct the misallocation of capital induced by financial frictions.
The second set of variables to condition on includes measures of domestic economic pol-
icy and macroeconomic fundamentals. These variables could give investors an idea about the
extent of debt burden or laxity of lending standards in a given country. Policies that histor-
ically contributed to financial integration include the adherence to the Gold Standard prior
to the 1913 (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996), the credibility of this commitment (Mitchener and
Weidenmier, 2009), the reestablishment of the Gold Standard at pre-World War I parity in
the 1920s (Bordo et al., 1999a), the return to gold at a devalued parity plus prudent gov-
ernment fiscal policy and country reputation with respect to previous defaults (Obstfeld and
Taylor, 2003; 2004), stable economic and political environment (Flandreau and Zu´mer, 2004;
Ferguson and Schularick, 2008), and avoidance of excessive borrowing (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009). Flandreau and Zu´mer (2004) point that investors prior to 1913 assigned a secondary
18Recently Kalemli-Ozcan and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2010) provide evidence for the complementarity between
trade and financial flows of Germany, France, and the UK to the Ottoman Empire over 1859–1913, with the
causality running from trade to financial flows even conditional on the Ottoman sovereign default and following
the “supersactions” imposed.
19Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005) examine the role of various sanctions in promoting debt repayment during
the classical gold standard period, and find a significant decline in trade as a result of default only when gunboat
diplomacy or fiscal control (the “supersanctions”) was used by creditor countries.
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or indirect role to fiscal and monetary variables. Bordo et al. (1999a) find that inflation
became important in explaining return spreads during the interwar period. Fixed exchange
rate regimes were an important part of international monetary arrangements throughout the
history, and, depending on the degree of policy credibility, such rule-based monetary policy
could be stabilizing for globalization, as was the case during the Gold Standard (Bordo and
Rockoff, 1996), or disruptive, as seen in the late 1920s (see Bordo and Schwartz, 1999), around
the collapse of Bretton Woods, and during the early years of the European Monetary System.
Hence, their effect is ambiguous. The explicit capital controls and other restrictions on current
and capital account transactions are implemented by the governments in the effort to tame
the international capital flows. The effectiveness of these measures is an empirical question.
Ferguson and Schularick (2008) find that pre-WWI foreign investors in developing nations paid
more attention to these countries’ vulnerability to economic and political shocks than to their
commitment to a rules-based arrangement, such as the Gold Standard. The poorer developing
countries often lacked the credibility to convince lenders that they would stick to the standard
despite a formal commitment to it. Therefore, my third set of variables includes proxies for
economic shocks such as financial and economic crises or hyperinflation episodes.
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Correlations as measures of integration: A critical assessment
Interpreting a high correlation of economic series as evidence of substantial integration has
several issues.20 First, the literature often measures correlations of return spreads relative to a
particular economy. Over relatively long time periods, the choice of the reference country, and
thus the trends of its returns, might affect conclusions drawn from the correlations of spreads
versus that country. This is indeed the case in my data as Figure 3 shows where the correla-
tions of spreads versus the U.S. and Great Britain demonstrate the opposite pattern. Second,
while the conventional Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients do not require that
data is normally distributed, it is defined in terms of moments (covariance and the standard
deviations) that must exist. As such, one can always compute a sample correlation if the range
20In historical studies of equity market integration this measure was used, among others, by Goetzman et
al. (2005), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), and Quinn and Voth (2008).
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of the distribution is bounded. However, the sample correlation is not a robust statistics in
the presence of outliers or a heavy-tailed distribution (see Wilcox, 2005; Huber and Ronchetti,
2009). Third, conclusions about integration drawn from correlations may be biased by the con-
ditional heteroskedasticity of market returns, or the hypothesis that cross-market correlations
depend on market volatility, as argued by Boyer et al. (1999), Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
and Longin and Solnik (2001) among others. Boyer et al. (1999) demonstrate that one cannot
correct the problem by comparing an estimated correlation conditioned on the observed (or
ex post) realization of market returns because the conditional correlation is highly nonlinear
with respect to the level of return on which it is conditioned. Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
focus on clearly-defined episodes when a crisis in one market increases market volatility else-
where. They argue that in such cases conventional correlation coefficients are biased upward
and suggest a correction that crucially relies on certain statistical assumptions including that
the shock originates in a clearly identified market, there are no exogenous global shocks and
feedback from the other markets, the variance of the noise in links between countries remains
the same. Not only are these assumptions fairly restrictive in general, but we also need to
identify a clear exogenous event that could have caused a change in market volatility. Longin
and Solnik (2001) show that the correlation of market returns is mainly affected by market
trends, not the high volatility of returns per se. Correlations seem to increase only when asset
prices fall (bear markets); however, not when they are expected to rise (bull markets). These
issues are inherent flaws of correlations and the literature seemingly has not reach a consensus
on how to correct this problem in general. Fourth, and related to the previous, if the financial
markets are affected by a global shock in a similar fashion, the correlation across countries
might be high even without substantial integration. One cannot distinguish high integration
and a common shock as both may show up as a higher value of correlation. The adjustment
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) breaks down when a high cross-market volatility results from
the aggregate shock that is much larger than an idiosyncratic shock transmitted to a country’s
neighbors.
[insert Figure 3 here]
These interpretational and statistical issues make correlation coefficient an inadequate mea-
sure of integration. Very often, the observed differences in correlations result from the changes
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in statistical properties of a sample rather than from actual economic links. Therefore, the
study of integration over time should be complemented with an analysis of the shocks pertinent
to a group of countries in corresponding time periods.
4.2 Principal component analysis
I use principal component analysis to overcome the limitations of correlations in measuring
integration. This method is valid without needing specific assumptions regarding the particular
distributions of the data except that it does require the data is interval-level.21 This is the
first obvious advantage over the correlation, which is not a robust statistic in the presence of
heavy-tailed distributions observed in financial series.
Assume Xn×1 = {xi}ni=1 is a set of a relatively large number n of observed variables,
and we are interested in reducing the dimensionality of the data while retaining most of the
information about their variation. One Principal component analysis is a non-parametric
empirical methodology used to reduce the dimensionality and describe common features of
the data (see Jolliffe, 2002 for more details). The principal components are weighted linear
combinations of the original variables xi represented by the matrix system Fn×1 = αn×nXn×1
where, for example, the first line of the system takes the form f1 = a
′
1x = α11x1 + α12x2 +
. . .+α1nxn. The coefficients α11, α12, . . . , α1n, are called scoring coefficients or loadings by the
original series xi on the component f1. They are calculated in a way to guarantee the maximum
sample variance of f1. The restriction is imposed on a1 = (α1i) = (α11 α12 . . . α1n)
′ such
that the a′1a1 = 1 since otherwise the variance of f1 can be artificially increased by picking
larger α1i. Each subsequent component is orthogonal to the previous one (e.g., a
′
1a2 = 0) and
also has the maximum variance. Hence, f2 explains maximum of the residual variation after
the previous component f1 is removed form the data, and so forth. Technically, the coefficients
αji are the elements of an eigenvector of the sample covariance matrix Z corresponding to
the j-th largest eigenvalue, λj . With the above restriction on a1 to be a unit-length vector,
the variance of the component fj are the corresponding j-th eigenvalue of Z. In case when
the variables xi have different scales, the variables with larger standard deviations might have
larger weight by construction. In such case it is advisable to calculate the components from
21The data is interval-level if there is a meaningful continuous scale of measurement such that equal differences
in the scale correspond to equal differences in the physical quantities they measure.
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the sample correlation matrix which is analogous to standardizing all the variables prior to
calculation. The components are then ranked by their variance, with the first component
having the largest variance.22 The lower-order components typically yield a larger variance
compared to the original series. Additionally, each component of a higher order “explains”
most of the residual variation in the data that is not captured by the previous component, and
so on. As a result, a smaller number of components, often just the first component, summarizes
most of the observed variation in the data and filters out noise.
A few available papers have used the PCA to complement other techniques of measuring
financial integration. Most notably, Mauro et al. (2002) find that the first principal component
explains a large proportion of variation of sovereign bond spreads for a group of emerging
market countries from 1877–1913 and an even larger proportion in the 1990s. Earlier, Nellis
(1982) used PCA to compare interest rate comovement among industrialized countries before
and after the move to a floating exchange rate regime in the early 1970s and Gagnon and
Unferth (1995) examined their trends in 1977–1993. These studies look at the proportion
of the total variation in economic series described by the first principal component arguing
that a single variable explaining most of the variation in the data would indicate market
integration. Nellis (1982, p.346) cautions against the mechanical interpretation of the first
principal component as a measure for integration, however, does not explore this issue further.
A high and growing degree of integration among a subset of countries might generate a strong
component; therefore, we would find financial interdependence within that subset, but not
integration in the entire sample.23 The existence of several factors, each affecting only a
subset of countries in the total, would imply market segmentation according to Bordo and
Murshid (2006). They study the first three principal components in sovereign bond spreads
and find sharp distinctions in the patterns between advanced and emerging countries in the
1990s.
As such, the existing studies limit the use of PCA to calculating the principal components
22The total variance of n standardized data vectors xi is n. The proportion explained by, say, the first
component is calculated as a ratio of its variance (the first eigenvalue of Z) and the data total variance, n.
23The indicators of such possibilities include the following: (1) the first principal component does not affect
all countries uniformly (this means that correlation of individual variables with first principal component differs
a lot among countries), and (2) the remaining factors explain considerable amount of the residual variation after
the first component is accounted for.
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over a particular time period. In extension of the previous literature, I propose a systematic
methodology based on the method of principal components to measure economic integra-
tion over time. The details of practical implementation are discussed in the working paper
Volosovych (2011). The combined approach I advocate differs from the previous literature
along several dimensions. First, I estimate principal components with rolling windows. In
doing so, I use the proportion of the total variation in the level of individual returns explained
by the first principal component as a dynamic measure of integration in a group of countries.
This index of integration can be plotted over time to provide a visual illustration of the time
path of integration and be used to explain the discovered patterns in a regression framework.
Second, I recognize that the extraction of principal components from spreads requires the
choice of a reference country. The resulting patterns are benchmark-specific, and this could
affect the interpretation of results. In contrast to the studies by Mauro et al. (2002) and
Bordo and Murshid (2005), who work with bond return spreads, I apply PCA to the levels of
financial returns. In this case, assuming some integration across markets, the the first principal
component may naturally be interpreted as the unobserved “world” return since this factor
captures the most variation in individual returns. Of note, spreads versus this estimate of
world return are independent of a particular reference country, which is an advantage. Similar
interpretation is applicable to other markets with available price data, i.e., to the markets
where the notion “world price” exists.
The third consideration involves capturing possible group divergencies or country-specific
shocks. A high and growing degree of integration among a subset of countries, or simply
peculiar characteristics of a group, might generate a component with large variance. This is why
Bordo and Murshid (2005), who studied the data for advanced and emerging markets, discover
several components with large variance. The interpretation of the higher-order components
is generally theoretically difficult. For this reason, I analyze country, or group-specific effects
using two complementary indices of segmentation computed from country weights on the first
component. Tying financial integration and segmentation to the estimated world return has a
solid theoretical interpretation related to the UIP condition.
The final consideration involves the treatment of conditional heteroskedasticity. This is-
sue is an inherent flaw of correlations; however, is not known to plague the results of PCA,
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which is a more outlier-resistent and distributionally robust method. Still, I choose a rela-
tively wide window to guard against the short-term noise and possible issues of conditional
heteroskedasticity in returns.
5 Evidence from the index of integration
5.1 Historic sovereign bond data
Data availability and quality are the major challenges for empirical studies of integration
over the long-run. For example, to directly test for UIP or to estimate risk premia in (2),
one would need a relatively long time series of returns on comparable (in terms of currency,
maturity, liquidity, risk) assets, spot and forward exchange rates, determinants of risk, and
reliable estimates of market expectations. For the majority of countries such data is largely
not available or non-existent over the long run. Historical studies of integration focus on asset
data in the same currency and priced in a single market. As seen in (2), using such data allows
researchers to isolate country risk (if assets are in foreign currency) and default risk (if they
are also floated in a foreign financial center).24 This approach is appropriate if one studies
only the time period when the corresponding instruments are available; however, this might
be problematic over the long-term as pointed out by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003, 2004) who
argue that one cannot credibly compare two periods when the data are not consistent.
I use monthly bond data over 1875–2009 from the Global Financial Database (GFD). This
database contains monthly financial data from about 100 countries with bond and equity series
for some countries beginning as early as the 18th century. The GFD reports bond yields for
comparability. I make the following decisions to achieve data consistency (?? provides details
on bond data), referring to the descriptions of particular historical bond issues in the GFD
manual, Kimber’s Record of Government Debts and other Securities, published in 1920 and
1922, Bordo and Flandreau (2003), and other sources. First, I focus on long-term sovereign
bonds. Historically, this is the most actively traded segment of internationally financial mar-
kets.25 In contrast to stock market indices, the characteristics of the underlying financial
24Examples are secondary market yields on long-term government bonds in London (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996;
Mauro et al., 2002; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003, 2004) or the yields at the moment of new bond floatation in New
York that became an important bond market in the interwar period (Bordo et al., 1999a).
25Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) also stress that long-term bond yields are most appropriate for a study of the
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instruments (e.g., maturity, coupon payments, the identity of the issuer, and so on) are similar
across countries and remain relatively stable over time. Second, I choose the series with fewest
breaks. Most governments started to publish the unified indices of bond yields only in the
1920s.26 The breaks in the series are sometimes present when historic series are spliced in
GFD with the subsequent modern series. When multiple historical bond series are available I
choose the earlier series most comparable with the subsequent series. Third, where possible,
I use the series of bonds payable in national currency, even when some issues were floated in
London, because my goal is to analyze all possible reasons for changes in comovement includ-
ing exchange, political, default risk, cross-border frictions, and other limits to the arbitrage
discussed in Section 3. The later series are always payable in national currency. Fourth, I
use a fairly homogenous but representative sample of 15 relatively advanced economies whose
sovereign debt was continuously traded in the major international financial center (London)
as early as the mid-19th century. It is reasonable to assume that all these countries had sim-
ilar structural or institutional conditions, at least in relation to the development of financial
markets, if not the level of overall economic development. With a few exceptions, there were
no major defaults on government debt by these countries that would create discontinuities
in the time series. Countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States.27 For the longest time period, I use a sub-sample of 11 countries with appro-
priate yield data available for the entire time period.28 I decided to exclude British Empire
countries since colonial ties with the UK influenced their spread behavior (i.e., over the 1880–
1930, the Empire countries typically had interest rates within two percentage points of British
rates; see Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
Figure 2 illustrates the individual country returns used in this study with the values on the
international capital mobility because they are most directly related to the financing costs for capital investments.
26The League of Nations began to compile the internationally comparable financial data in 1920, but the
coverage improved only by the late 1920s. Goetzmann, et al. (2005) say that this was roughly the case for the
stock market indices.
27Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) study similar set of countries and refute the idea that these countries faced
different “shocks to technology” over the century. Bordo and Schwartz (1996) classify Austria, Denmark, Italy,
Japan, Spain and the U.S. to be emerging countries in pre-World War I period.
28I exclude Austria, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland whose consistent bond yield series start in the GFD
after World War I. For example, for Switzerland the only data available before 1925 is the average of 12 state
and federal railway bonds. In other cases, I only have the data for the sovereign bonds payable in gold until the
late 1920s, which does not allow to investigate the currency risk.
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left axis and the estimated “world” return (the first principal component) on the right axis.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for bond returns across exogenous periods according
to prevailing international monetary arrangements as defined by Bordo and Schwartz (1999).
With slight modifications these periods include (1) Classical Gold Standard, 1875:01–1914:07;
(2) Interwar Period, 1919:01–1939:08; (3) Bretton Woods System, 1945:06–1971:07; (4) Modern
Float, 1971:08–1990:12; and (5) Modern Globalization, 1991:01–2008:09 (I also combine the
latter two periods into a single Post-Bretton Woods period).29 The first two columns report
the average return and corresponding standard deviation for each country over the entire time
period. The remainder of the table reports the average returns across five historical periods.
For all the countries, bond returns remained low and stable throughout the first half of the 20th
century. Following World War II, the returns rose continuously reaching double digits in the
1970s–80s, then turned down sharply in the 1990s. The 1971–1990 period was also exceptional
as evidenced by the highest variability or returns. Volatility decreased somewhat in the 1990s;
however, did not reach the low pre-World War II level. A similar pattern is observed in
the behavior of cross-section variability of returns. Specifically, both unadjusted and mean-
adjusted cross-section standard deviations imply a hump-shaped pattern of variability with
the top during the Bretton Woods and Modern Float and the tendency for convergence during
the last period. The general ranking of countries in terms of levels of returns is approximately
preserved over time despite some important changes in individual yields over time.
[insert Table 1 here]
5.2 Trend in bond markets integration
Before turning to my method, I follow a few existing studies and calculate the proportion of
total variation in 11 bond returns explained by the first principal component over the pre-
defined periods. The proportion is equal to 76% over 1875–1913, 55% over 1919–1939, 84%
over 1945–1971, 60% over 1971–1990, and 95% over 1991–2008.30 Based on this measure, the
29I omit the years of two world wars because then markets were usually inactive and reliability of data is
questionable. I also define the sub-periods to obtain the maximum coverage across countries. Sometimes I have
to fill the missing values with linear interpolation but preferred not to do interpolation where the data were
missing in the beginning of the sub-sample for a particular country. In such case the series for this country is
started from first available observation.
30The pattern is similar for 15-country sample with Austria, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland over four periods
starting 1919.
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comovement of bond markets is higher “now” than ever before. In addition, the comovement
was relatively high from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system and was interrupted by the turbulent 1970s–80s. Still, a single factor explained more
than a half of the variation in bond yields over the five periods, and 83% over the entire period
from 1875 to 2008. These findings are broadly consistent with the other studies, however, mask
interesting dynamics.
The dynamic approach outlined in Section 4 reveals shorter-run patterns in comovement
that are obscured when comparing only two exogenously-chosen (and arguably ad hoc) periods
of globalization. I estimate principal components for 11 bond series using 156 month centered
rolling window.31 The graph of the total variation in returns explained by the first principal
component, the index of integration, is presented in Figure 4 together with a smoothed trend
line. Based on this figure, we can draw the following conclusions. First, consistent with the
literature, the dynamics of integration was not even over 130 years. Integration grew from
the late-19th century up to 1914, when World War I broke out. Following this, the trend in
integration turned negative and reached a historic low around the time of the Great Depression
during the 1930s. There was a partial recovery of international financial linkages in the 1920s;
however, it was very short-lived. After World War II, the trend in integration turned positive
and continued its upward crawl almost non-interrupted to the present time. Second, despite
the common view, it is clear that in the present group of countries integration in sovereign
bond market reached the levels comparable to the Gold Standard era as early as the late 1960s,
on the verge of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Third, the evidence points to a
higher financial market integration at the end of the 20th century compared to the earlier
periods. The integration thus followed a J -shaped trend with a trough as early as the 1920s,
rather than a U-shape, as documented by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
[insert Figure 4 here]
To verify whether the graphical evidence for the J-shaped pattern holds true in a statistical
sense, I run a regression of the index of integration on linear and quadratic time trend over the
31Estimations with the bandwidth of 120 and 180 months produced very similar pattern. In addition, I used
the historic bond data from 1880 to 1914 kindly shared by Marc Weidenmier, used in Mitchener and Weidenmier
(2009). The resulting pattern of index of integration is very similar and available upon request.
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period 1975–2002.32 I assume the error structure is heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to
12 months, and also control for the periods of two world wars. Column (1) of Table 2 shows
the regression for the monthly index of integration. The coefficients of linear and quadratic
trends are highly significant and point to a non-linear trend line. The values of the coefficients
imply that the trough in the trend in integration is around Sept. 1928, which is remarkably
consistent with the historical evidence pointing at the Great Depression as a “watershed”
of financial integration (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; 2004). The fact that the minimum in
integration corresponds to the late 1920s, closer to the beginning of the sample period used for
this estimation, is evidence that the trend line follows a J-shape over the period 1975–2009.
Columns (2) and (3) repeat the exercise using quarterly or yearly averages of the monthly
data. The results using these “smoothed” series are very similar, with the minima around the
time of the Great Depression.
[insert Table 2 here]
6 Toward explaining integration patterns
To prove that my method reflects dynamics of bond market integration and not something else,
in particular common shocks, I employ a series of additional checks. The evidence provided so
far shows that the recent period is characterized the largest proportion of variation attributed
to a single important factor than ever before. Potentially, the index of integration may have
a lower value due to country- or group-specific effects. The situation when the majority of
countries move in different directions would imply a true “lack of integration” since some
forces impair the comovement of most countries. However, if just a few countries drop out of
the group, this would be an example of a “regional crisis” since most of the countries would
still be moving together with the world and only a small number would diverge. I conjecture
that the previous period of high integration, prior to World War I, witnessed many country- or
group-specific shocks.33 Principal component analysis allows for the testing of this conjecture.
32Since the index of integration is estimated by a centered moving window of 156 months (13 years), the ends
of the periods would use less observations. In the regressions I prefer using the index estimated with all the
data. The results over longer period of time, up to 2008:09 are very similar.
33This claim would be consistent with the conclusion of Mauro et al. (2002) that sudden changes in spreads
in recent years were associated with global crises whereas country events had a bigger role in the 1870–1913.
21
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
As discussed in ??, the PCA normalizes the original series to a variance of one. Normally,
the lower proportion of total variation explained by the first component implies the existence
of a larger number of components with variances (eigenvalues) greater than one, each of them
explaining more variation than any original series. In my sample, the number of principal
components with eigenvalues greater than one indeed varies over time. Across exogenous
historical periods, this number is two over 1875–mid-1914, three over 1919–1939, one in 1945–
1971, two over 1971–1990, and one over 1991–2009 or over 1971–2009. This finding further
alarms us about the possibility of market segmentation and country-specific shocks before the
two world wars and during the Bretton Woods period.
6.1 Country effects, group divergencies, and index of segmentation
Country loadings on the first principal component, represented by the coefficients α1i (see Sec-
tion 4), help identify the periods of sudden drops in individual country comovement with the
world, or group divergencies. Countries with larger loadings contribute the most to the unob-
served world return approximated by the first principal component; low or negative loadings
reveal those countries whose bond returns move independently. I investigate time patterns
of loadings, close in spirit to study by Nellis (1982) does.34 Using country loadings on the
first principal component, one can recover correlations of the unobserved world return with
country returns, which are easier to interpret.35 The dynamics of the correlations are reported
in Figure 5. Overall, the correlations of country bond yields with the world are quite high—all
the countries remain relatively integrated into international financial markets. However, there
are noticeable periods when the individual bond returns moved independently form the world
return. In addition, there are some periods when several countries have such decoupling si-
multaneously. For example, there are noticeable clustering of lower correlations for Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States from approximately 1894 to 1902; for Belgium,
34Bordo and Murshid (2006) explore the loadings of the first and higher-order principal components and
use cluster analysis to divide countries into the groups. In this study I am more interested in the analysis of
integration of all in-sample countries. Grouping of countries based on some criterion is an important exercise
but is of the secondary interest for my study.
35As discussed in Joliffe (2002), the estimates of the correlation between observed variables xi and unobserved
first principal component f1 can be derived from the eigenvalue decomposition of the sample covariance matrix.
The correlations are equal to the product of a country loadings (α11 α12 . . . α1n)
′ and the square root of
corresponding eigenvalue. Therefore, the loadings are proportional to the correlation coefficient. In the rest of
the paper I study correlations calculated in this way.
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France, Germany, and Spain in the mid-1920s–late 1930s; for Germany and Great Britain in
1973–early 1980s; and for Norway and Sweden in the 1980s.
[insert Figure 5 here]
In addition to index of integration, I develop a companion measure that summarizes
country- or group-specific effects. I argue that such index of segmentation should supplement
analysis of markets comovement to give a more complete picture about the dynamics of inte-
gration. Figure 6 presents two versions of the index of segmentation. The line is the standard
deviation of the individual country loadings associated with the first principal component and
the bars represent the number of countries out of 11 (the sample size) with negative loadings.
Both indices of segmentation show that the “crises” picked up by the index of integration in
various time periods are in fact brought about by very different causes. There was little integra-
tion in the entire sample at the turn of the 20th century: all countries frequently diverted from
the group and their weights in the world return varied. In contrast, post-World War I “crises”
were caused by some individual divergences, where at most two countries diverted from the
group. The post-Bretton Woods era does not observe even this kind of divergences. Notably,
there is a short period of discontinuity in British rate comovement and some instability at the
end of the 1970s. Otherwise, integration of bond markets of in-sample countries is remarkable.
In Volosovych (2011), I name a number of global and country events that could have caused
the time pattern of integration discovered by indices of integration and segmentation seen in
Figures 4–6. Overall, the methodology advocated in this paper matches country events and
global crises in financial integration remarkably well.
[insert Figure 6 here]
6.2 Role of global market environment, economic policies, and shocks
I include proxies for market frictions, policies and institutional arrangements into the time-
series regression of Table 2 in order to study which factors were associated with the observed
pattern of integration more formally. The first variable is a proxy for pro-globalization market
environment, measured by the trade openness. The average trade openness is defined as average
over in-sample countries of exports plus imports over GDP. I supplement the historic trade
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data on the merchandize trade from Brian Mitchell’s International Histological Statistics with
the modern data on trade in goods and services by splicing the series from approximately 1960
so that the break is minimized. The second set of variables includes measures of domestic
economic policy and macroeconomic fundamentals. I use the cross-sectional average inflation
rate as a proxy of overall laxity of government policy, such as the degree of commitment to
a fixed exchange rate regime or inclination to finance excessive government expenditures. I
calculate inflation rate as an ex post year-on-year change in monthly CPI, based on GFD
data supplemented by data from the International Historical Statistics volumes and the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics database starting from 2003. In the regressions I use annual
averages of these series to smooth volatility and because earlier price data is often available only
at the annual frequency. In addition, to control for fiscal policy, I compute the cross-sectional
average government deficit to GDP using annual data from Bordo et al. (2001), supplemented
with the negative of the overall budget balance from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators database in the 1990s and 2000s .36 For each country in my sample, I construct
the monthly binary variable equal to 1 if the country pursued an exchange rate regime other
than a free flat in a given time period. I also construct the binary variable equal to 1 for
periods of capital controls. Similarly to Bordo (1999), I treat the ‘capital controls’ broadly to
include various restrictions on capital (in/out)flows or foreign currency transactions, foreign
exchange controls, and other frictions related to currency convertibility. I use annual dummies
from Bordo et al. (2001) and adjust them to the exact months of changes in the regimes and
capital controls using qualitative descriptions in this paper, Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Bordo
and Rockoff (1996), Eichengreen (1994, 1996), Bordo (1999), and other sources (the details of
these adjustments are available from the author). The variable Prevalence of Capital Controls
is the fraction of countries with restrictions on capital flows in a given time period. The
variable Prevalence of Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes is constructed similarly using monthly
exchange rate regime dummies. My third set of variables includes proxies for economic shocks
36The series is the Cash surplus/deficit, %GDP. Such flow measure was used by Bordo and Rockoff (1996)
and Bordo et al. (1999a) while Flandreau et al. (1998) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) advocate the stock
of public debt to GDP as a better measure of overall country solvency. Besides the difficulty to construct a
consistent series of debt/GDP ratio over 100+ years, Flandreau and Zu´mer (2004) argue that the nominal debt
is a poor measure of true indebtedness because the burden depends on the interest rate at which the debt is
issued, not on its nominal amount.
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such as financial and economic crises or hyperinflation episodes. In order to control for the
episodes of financial crises I refer to the chronology described in Bordo et al. (2001) and define
a binary variable taking the value of 1 in the first and on-going years of banking, currency,
or twin crisis, excluding the recovery period. The variable Prevalence of Financial Crises is
the fraction of in-sample countries in the crisis state. I also control for “economic disasters”,
defined by Barro and Ursua (2008) as cumulative declines in consumption by at least 10% and
shown to significantly affect the rates of return for stocks, bills, and bonds. Typically, GDP
and consumption fall concurrently; however, I prefer using consumption disasters since these
might cause more pressure on the government to change policies because of social unrest. The
variable Prevalence of Consumption Disasters is the fraction of countries that have experienced
extreme declines in consumption during a given time period. I also control for the hyperination
years including the incidents covering my larger sample of 15 countries: Germany (1923), Italy
(1944), Greece (1946), and Japan (1946-47) based to Bordo et al. (2001). Despite being a
country phenomenon, hyperinflation could have international effects. Finally, in this group, I
include the average country risk, computed as the cross-sectional average of individual bond
spreads versus the estimated “world” return, to capture all unaccounted country characteristics
that may discourage foreign investment and thus negatively affect integration.
Table 3 presents the regressions of the monthly index of integration on the time trend,
world war periods, and groups of controls separately. The definitions of the variables imply
the following interpretation of results. If a particular explanatory variable is positive significant
then this factor may be consistent with market integration or reflect a common shock affecting
all or most of the countries, which may be interpreted as evidence of market integration too
(see Bordo et al., 2001). Negative significance would be consistent with declines in integra-
tion. Column (1) indicates that trade openness was, on average, complementary to financial
openness as the literature shows. In fact, the loss of significance of the trend terms indicates
that trade openness is quite important. Columns (2)–(6) focus on policies. Columns (2)–
(3) indicate that high-inflation and high-government deficit policies generally were associated
with a divergence of returns or lower integration; the average inflation and budget deficit have
negative coefficients individually and together. In column (5), the addition of the Prevalence
of Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes results in the budget deficit variable being insignificant,
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while the average inflation remains negative significant. Pegged exchange rate regime itself
is positive significant in support of the argument that these policies mostly served as a cred-
ible commitment device in this group of countries. The last policy variable, the Prevalence
of Capital Controls, added in column (6), is negative significant, although at the 10% level
only. I do not consider this evidence strong enough to conclude that over the last 100+ years
governments have been generally successful in containing capital mobility. It is important to
observe that the trends remain significant in the regressions with policy controls. This implies
that policy variables have a secondary importance in explaining time variation in integration.
The remainder of the table looks at the role of various economic shocks. The majority of
crises happened during the turbulent 1920s and post-WWII, which also saw the remarkable
hyperinflation spells in central European countries. When included, the hyperinflation years
are negative and very significant. Apparently, hyperinflations were detrimental to the overall
integration but were not global shocks that would force most of the yields to move together
and result in a positive coefficient. Columns (7)–(9) show that financial (banking, currency,
or twin) crises have an expected negative sign but are insignificant, whereas the episodes of
extreme falls in consumption are significant and associated with lower values of index of inte-
gration. Finally, column (10) includes the Average Country Risk, which can be interpreted as a
broad proxy for the “unexplained” factors priced into the country yields. As seen, the country
risk is significant and negatively correlated with the index, which I interpret as evidence of the
overall backlash against integration when the overall (actual or perceived) level of risk rose.
Upon inclusion of this control, both explicit measures of crises are negative, as expected, but
insignificant. As in the case of policy controls, the measures of economic shocks by themselves
are not sufficient to “explain” the J-shape in integration.
[insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 combines these controls in one multiple regression to determine which of them are
“preferred” by the data. Column (1) shows that trade openness and the prevalence of pegged
exchange rate regimes remain significantly positively correlated with the index of integration
while average inflation rate and the measure of overall unexplained country risk have negative
significant coefficients. The hyperinflation years saw lower integration while world wars still
appear as important global shocks. Capital controls did not seem to tame financial returns
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from moving together, and financial or macroeconomic crises seem to work their way through
the overall country risk. The linear time trend lost it significance while the quadratic trend
remains positive and significant.
[insert Table 4 here]
Figure 4 reveals that according to the integration index the sovereign bond markets became
quite synchronized by the late Bretton Woods years. One may worry that in that quiescent
era, there weren’t many shocks and the integration looks high because the yields of all or most
countries had little variance, while in fact most markets remained segmented. To address such
concern, I would like to point out that according to the descriptive statistics of the return
data the entire Bretton Woods period was not exceptional (compared to, for example, the
Gold Standard) in terms of low volatility of interest rates (see Table 1). Furthermore, as
seen in Figure 4 the relatively high level of integration is observed only in late 1960s, close
or on the verge of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, which fell precisely because
governments were unable or unwilling to tame trade flows and associated with them flows of
capital. Nevertheless, in column (2) of Table 3 I include the Bretton Woods Period dummy
(taking the value of 1 in the period 1945:06–1971:07, and 0 otherwise, using the timing from
Bordo and Schwartz, 1999) to control for the characteristics of the period that my other
controls might have missed. The Bretton Woods dummy appears positive significant implying
high comovement of returns during this period. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the dummy
eliminates the significance of the variable Prevalence of Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes because
the majority of such regimes was observed exactly during the Bretton Woods era of fixed
exchange rate regime centered around the U.S. dollar. The fiscal policy variable becomes weak
negative significant, which is what we would expect in theory. Finally, the coefficient to the
unexplained Country Risk remains significant but falls on absolute value, which implies that
that variable partially captured the phenomenon of Bretton Woods. The significance of other
variables were not affected. Most importantly, the U-shape long-run pattern of integration
survives and gains in statistical significance.
One might argue that 6-lags (half-year) order assumed for the error structure might be too
short to account for autocorrelation and to produce consistent standard errors. In column (3),
I allow for 12 lags (one year) in errors in specification of column (1) with similar results except
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that now the trend terms and world war dummies are insignificant at conventional levels.
This result is intuitive since usually there is a great deal of persistence in monthly financial
data. The inspection of Figure 4 reveals some short-term volatility in the index of integration
and the same could be true in the monthly explanatory variables. Even so, short-term noise
in the dependent variable would end-up in the error term and would not bias the coefficient
estimates. It is also unlikely that the noise would affect the regression results given the long-run
horizon. Still, in the remainder of the table I smooth the data by taking quarterly and annual
averages of the monthly series and preserve one year-long lag structure in the Newey-West
errors. The results in the remainder of the table match the results of monthly data well. The
significance of the coefficients with annual averages decreases, especially for trade, perhaps due
to over-smoothing or a smaller sample size.
6.3 Discussion and implications
The evidence from the multiple regression analysis shows that both policy variables and global
environment factors are correlated with broad long-term integration trends. I must stress
that the evidence in these regressions should not be interpreted as causal. It is possible
that governments would respond to changes in integration with certain policies. As such,
establishing a causal relationship is an important but difficult task because of simultaneity in
the degree of integration, policies, institutional changes, market frictions, shocks, and so on. In
addition, my measure of integration does not tell what parties, private or public, dominated the
sovereign debt markets in a particular time period. For example, it is possible that a relatively
high degree of integration in the late 1960s was due to the lending/borrowing by governments
instead of by private parties, while the anecdotal evidence points on the growing role of the
private sector (see Eichengreen, 1996; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009; and footnote 8). The task
of this paper was more modest and included a search for broad patterns of integration that are
common across countries and over a very long period. Uncovering explicable factors that are
correlated with the degree of integration could point to policies and local or global institutional
arrangements that are conducive to financial globalization.
It is important to remember that the UIP condition with risk is one but not the only
criterion of integration. The UIP is an appropriate theoretical benchmark for exploring fi-
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nancial markets integration from the prospective of investors in financial assets or financial
arbitrageurs. In contrast, a domestic investor speculating in foreign goods or simply consider-
ing returns in her own country focuses on real rather than nominal returns. As the result of real
arbitrage, the Real Interest Parity condition would hold by which the expected real interest
rate differential is zero or possibly constant. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003, 2004) also note that
real long-term bond returns are most directly related to the costs of capital investments and
the expected marginal return on investment. Convergence of real interest rates is thus a broad
measure of financial integration because in integrated economies we would observe convergence
of the real rates of return on both physical assets and financial assets. A study of integration in
markets for real assets should then be motivated by the real arbitrage considerations, and the
integration could be measured by the comovement of real interest rates within the PCA frame-
work I advocate here. In a working paper version of this paper I computed the expected real
returns and established the similar pattern of integration based on real and nominal returns,
except for some short-run differences, particularly in the 1950s (see Volosovych, 2011).
Overall, the historic data shows that when inflation rates were relatively low, fiscal policy
was prudent, and countries adopted some form of pegged exchange rate arrangement, integra-
tion was higher. When the world was open to trade, finance generally followed (or went hand
in hand). This evidence should not be interpreted literally as, for example, the case for the
fixed exchange rate regimes in order to promote integration. Rather, the low inflation, inter-
national monetary arrangements based on certain rules, and openness to trade seem to signal
the commitment of countries to good economic policies and global cooperation in general. The
fact that the pattern of integration resembles a J-shape in combination with the finding that
these particular policies have the strongest correlation with the integration index indirectly
show that such policies were likely to have caused the upward trend in integration we have
experienced since the 1930s. The significance of the war and hyperinflation stresses the im-
portance of accounting for global and large country shocks in measuring integration. Finally,
the results show that there remains an unexplained variation in integration, captured by the
average level of country risk. Further research might shed light on additional explanations of
financial integration patterns.
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7 Conclusion
I propose a systematic methodology based on the method of principal components to quantify
economic integration, explore its dynamics, and capture the episodes of market segmentation.
This method overcomes the limitations of conventional approaches. Despite its computational
simplicity, the suggested methodology is quite general and applicable to a variety of markets.
I explore why the existing empirical literature, which relies on comovement of economic
variables, lacks consensus on whether the highest degree of integration was achieved before
World War I under the Gold Standard or by the late 20th century. I argue that a conventional
measure of comovement, the coefficient of correlation, has limited applicability as a measure
of economic integration. Based on the suggested methodology I find clear evidence of higher
financial integration at the end of the 20th century compared to the earlier periods.
Time-series regressions show that both policy variables (average inflation, average govern-
ment deficit, and the fixed exchange-rate regime during Bretton Woods) and the global market
environment (approximated by the average trade openness) played a role in explaining the time
variation in the index of integration. I also find that “unexplained” changes in overall level
of country risk are also empirically important, which warrants further research on the factors
behind the unexplained country risk.
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Table 2: Trend in bond markets integration. Time-series regressions, 1875–2002
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Index of Integration
Type of data Monthly Quarterly Yearly
Time Trend –.636*** –1.91*** –7.65***
(.081) (.263) (1.86)
Time Trend2 .493*** 4.43*** 70.50***
(.049) (.477) (13.20)
World Wars .013 .013 .014
(.057) (.062) (.106)
Observations 1,526 509 128
Lags Included 12 4 1
F-stat 48.52 42.33 13.61
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** , **, *, and † denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and
15% levels. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to the lag order shown
in the table. Index of Integration is the estimate of the proportion of variation in the group of 11 bond returns
explained by the first principal component. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered
rolling window with the bandwidth of 156 months. Time period is for monthly regression is 1875:01–2002:02
and chosen to always have 156 month of data to estimate the dependent variable. In-sample countries are
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United
States. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window with the bandwidth of
156 months. World Wars is the indicator variable taking the value of one in 1914:08–1918:11 and 1939:09–
1945:08 and zero otherwise. Quarterly and yearly data uses the corresponding averages of the monthly data.
See Section 6 for the detailed explanation of the variables.
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Table 4: Determinants of bond markets integration. Time-series regressions, 1875–2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Index of Integration
Type of data Monthly Quarterly Yearly
Time Trend –.237 –.266* –.237 –.702 –.772+ –2.69 –2.89
(.152) (.151) (.204) (.520) (.516) (3.41) (3.40)
Time Trend2 .215** .190* .215 1.919* 1.666+ 29.84 24.42
(.104) (.099) (.140) (1.067) (1.017) (27.84) (26.53)
Average Trade .326*** .456*** .326** .318** .452*** .278 .427*
Openness (.122) (.118) (.163) (.139) (.136) (.227) (.222)
Average Annual –.020*** –.025*** –.020** –.021*** –.026*** –.025* –.032***
Inflation Rate (.007) (.007) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.013) (.012)
Average Government –.024 –.533+ –.024 –.084 –.649* –.365 –1.144+
Deficit (.346) (.333) (.434) (.403) (.391) (.702) (.739)
Prevalence of Pegged .147*** –.000 .147*** .146*** –.001 .136** –.037
Exchange Rate Regimes (.031) (.042) (.040) (.035) (.048) (.058) (.081)
Prevalence of .037 –.068+ .037 .035 –.069 .025 –.097
Capital Controls (.034) (.043) (.045) (.039) (.049) (.065) (.080)
Hyperinflation Years –.064*** –.076*** –.064** –.063** –.071*** –.058 –.061+
(.024) (.023) (.028) (.027) (.026) (.042) (.038)
Prevalence of .046 .062+ .046 .047 .065+ .051 .057
Financial Crises (.044) (.038) (.054) (.049) (.042) (.068) (.059)
Prevalence of .023 .025 .023 .014 .019 –.026 –.023
Consumption Disasters (.064) (.064) (.083) (.075) (.075) (.122) (.125)
Average Country Risk –.234*** –.199*** –.234*** –.239*** –.207*** –.270** –.234*
(.061) (.061) (.081) (.071) (.070) (.119) (.118)
World Wars .096** .164*** .096 .110* .181*** .174 .268**
(.049) (.047) (.060) (.060) (.058) (.119) (.118)
Bretton Woods .171*** .168*** .187***
Period (.039) (.045) (.071)
Observations 1416 1416 1416 472 472 118 118
Lags Included 6 6 12 2 2 1 1
F-stat 44.23 58.20 39.60 38.08 48.12 30.07 28.51
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** , **, *, and † denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%
and 15% levels. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to the lag order
shown in the table. Index of Integration is the estimate of the proportion of variation in the group of 11
bond returns explained by the first principal component. The estimation of the component is performed as the
centered rolling window with the bandwidth of 156 months. Time period is chosen to always have 156 month of
data to estimate the dependent variable. In-sample countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. The estimation of the component
is performed as the centered rolling window with the bandwidth of 156 months. Average Country Risk is the
average across in-sample countries of the bond spread versus the estimate “world” return. The “world” return is
the first principal component of country bond returns. “Prevalence of X” denotes a fraction of countries where
X occurs in a given time period. “Bretton Woods Period” is the binary variable taking the value of 1 in the
period 1945:06–1971:07, and 0 otherwise. See Section 6 for detailed definitions of the variables. Quarterly and
yearly data uses the corresponding averages of the monthly data.
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Figure 1: Long-run trend in bond market integration, 1900–2008
Proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the 1st principal component (smoothed series)
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Notes: Estimates of the proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the first principal component
smoothed using the uniformly weighted moving average smoother. Government bond returns are in levels. In-
sample countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and United States. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window
with the bandwidth of 156 months.
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Figure 2: Yields on sovereign long-term bonds and the estimated “world” return, 1875–2002
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Notes:
The graph depicts historical monthly series for the yields on long-term government bonds issued by industrialized
economies (thin solid lines, left axis) and the estimated “world” return (thick dashed line, right axis). The
following abbreviations for the country names are used at the graph: AUT for Austria, BEL for Belgium, DNK
for Denmark, FIN for Finland, FRA for France, DEU for Germany, ITA for Italy, JPN for Japan, NLD for
the Netherlands, NOR for Norway, ESP for Spain, SWE for Sweden, SWI for Switzerland, GBR for United
Kingdom, and USA for the United States. World is the estimate of the first principal component using all
countries (the “world” return). The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window
with the bandwidth of 156 months.
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Figure 3: Long-run trends in bond market correlations, 1875–2002
Average correlation for bond spreads versus U.S. and Great Britain
Estimation over historical sub-periods
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Notes: Average correlation is calculated as the arithmetic average of off-diagonal pairwise correlation coefficients
of individual country bond spreads versus the U.S. 10-year bond and British Consol. The correlations are
calculated using monthly data over historic sub-periods defined in Section 5.1. Country sample includes countries
used in the empirical analysis; they are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, and Sweden. Austria, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland were omitted due to lots of missing observations
before 1919.
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Figure 4: Index of integration in bond markets and its long-run trend, 1875–2008
Proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the 1st principal component
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Notes: Index of integration (thin red line) is the proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the first
principal component. The trend line (thick blue line) is the smoothed estimate of the Index of integration using
the uniformly weighted moving average smoother. Government bond returns are in levels. In-sample countries
are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
United States. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window with the bandwidth
of 156 months.
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Figure 5: Country-specific effects. The correlations of individual returns with the 1st principal
component, 1875–2002
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Notes: For detailed notes see the continuation of this figure on the following page.
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Notes: Correlations of individual returns with the 1st principal component. The correlation between an observed
returns and unobserved first principal component is computed as explained in Section ??. The extraction of
the 1st principal component is performed for the sample of 11 countries using centered moving window time
sub-sample with 156 months bandwidth. In-sample countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Figure 6: Segmentation in bond markets, 1875–2002
Variability of the loadings of the bond returns
on the 1st principal component (Indices of segmentation)
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Notes: The line is the standard deviation of the individual countries’ component loadings associated with the
1st principal component (right scale). Bars represent number of countries out of 11 with negative loadings (left
scale). The extraction of the 1st principal component is performed for the sample of 11 countries using centered
moving window time sub-sample with 156 months bandwidth. In-sample countries are Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Letter to the Editor of Journal of International Money and Finance,
Prof. James R. Lothian
Re: Ms. Ref. No. JIMF-D-07-00027 (Second Revision)
Title: Measuring Financial Market Integration Over the Long Run: Is there a U-shape?
Dear Professor Lothian:
Thank you very much for your decision to provisionally accept my paper with the reference
number JIMF-D-07-00027 for publication at the JIMF. In this version of the manuscript I
implemented the following.
1. I incorporated the changes you suggested with respect to JIMF styling and the placement
of the acknowledgements
2. I tried to make paper somewhat shorter and further streamlined it (also the comment of
the Referee No.1). In particular, I eliminated all the appendices from the manuscript,
referring the reader to the long working paper version available online at the Tinbergen
Institute WP series.
3. I chose to add some technical details on the method of principal components into the
methodology Section 4.2 (since the corresponding appendix is gone), while a short non-
technical explanation is left in the Introduction. This did not increase the length of the
paper.
4. I placed the discussion of the theoretical literature behind my conditional regressions (the
conditioning variables) in the Conceptual Issues Section 3. This part of the literature
review is placed now immediately where I first mention that I verify how the comovement
of returns changed over time, conditional on time-varying determinants of risk premia.
I think this improves the flow of the paper.
5. I duly addressed very useful further comments of the Referee No.2. While I was awaiting
the rely on the first revision of this paper I started two extensions of this current project.
1
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Interestingly, the two comments I received from the Referee (the integration in finan-
cial markets vs. markets for real assets/capital goods; and possible use of higher-order
components to help understand the integration patterns) point into the same direction.
I attach a letter to the Referee with my detailed replies to his/her queries and explain
the extent to which I choose to incorporate these points to the second revision. Briefly,
I offer some insights about my current findings on these issues in that letter. But in
the current manuscript, I follow your advice and I refer the reader to the longer working
paper version. Still, I think the issues raised by the Referee are extremely important
and I mention them in the appropriate places of the text (Conceptual Issues, Discussion,
etc.).
In conclusion, I would like to thank you and the referees for the contribution to my research.
The second round was a very useful experience for me, and the paper further improved as the
result. I hope you would share my optimism and remain
Sincerely yours, June 26, 2011
Vadym Volosovych
Assistant Professor of Finance, Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Letter to the Referee 2 of the Ms. Ref. No. JIMF-D-07-00027
Title: Measuring Financial Market Integration Over the Long Run: Is there a U-shape?
I appreciate the Referee 2’s thorough review of my revised paper and his/her further comments.
In this letter, I offer a more detailed replies to the Referee’s queries and explain the extent to which
I choose to incorporate these points to the second revision.
Specific comments
Comment 1: First, I think the appendix Table E-1 evidence deserves a mention: when we use
real rates the picture changes and the ”puzzling” high integration in the Bretton Woods era seems
to go away a bit.
I follow the advice of the Referee 2 from the first round and take a prospective of an international
investor in financial markets and use the the no-arbitrage UIP condition as a benchmark. This
approach, according to the the Referee, is more appropriate for a study of financial integration. I
agree with such assessment.
The theoretical argument is as follows. As a result of international financial arbitrage by the
exchange (or currency) risk-neutral investors, similar financial assets in different locations have the
same expected rate of return regardless of exposure to the exchange risk. Standard no-arbitrage
theory in finance furhter predicts that, when market frictions are negligible, free international
capital flows result in the Uncovered Interest Parity condition. In contrast, a domestic investor
speculating in foreign goods or simply considering returns in her own country focuses on real rather
than nominal returns. As the result of real arbitrage, the Real Interest Parity condition would
hold by which the expected real interest rate differential is zero or possibly constant. Obstfeld and
Taylor (2003, 2004) also note that real long-term bond returns are most directly related to the
costs of capital investments and the expected marginal return on investment. Convergence of real
interest rates is thus a broad measure of financial integration because in an integrated economy we
would observe convergence of the real rates of return on both physical assets and financial assets.
Lothian (2002) points to another complication explaining that ex ante real rates converge if either
UIP and PPP both hold perfectly, or deviations from the two conditions completely offset one
another (if they are due to a common cause, such as errors in forecasts of exchange rate). Having
computed the expected real returns I established (in the appendix Appendix E of the first revision)
the similar pattern of integration based on real and nominal returns, except for some short-run
differences, particularly in the 1950s.
I am sympathetic to the Referee’s interest in my findings and, following the Referee’s Comment
1, explicitly mention in the Introduction whose prospective I take in this paper. In the Discussion
1
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section of the second revision I remind the reader that the UIP condition with risk is one but not
the only criterion of integration. A study of integration in markets for real assets should then
be motivated by the real arbitrage considerations, and the integration could be measured by the
comovement of real interest rates within the PCA framework I advocate. I also mention some
evidence on the integration of markets for real assets from the Appendix E from the previous
revision, which is now available as a longer working paper version. Given the request of the other
Referee and the Editor to further shorten and streamline the paper, I think it is prudent not to add
much further information on comovement of the real rates and integration of markets for capital
investments (the real arbitrage). I am working on extending the analysis in Appendix E of the first
revision to become a companion paper with the focus on possible differences when we use nominal
versus real returns within the method of principal components.
Comment 2: ...suppose the first principal component really WAS the same at all times, and
really DID capture integration, but that a 2nd component (due to some other idiosyncratic shocks
to, eg fear/uncertainty/growth,...) was present. Now if the variance of the 2nd component goes
DOWN, the % explained by the first will go UP by construction. I suspect this also helps explain
the Bretton Woods puzzle. In that quiescent era, there weren’t many shocks (eg financial repressions,
steady growth, government macromanagement etc). Thus no wonder there isn’t much role for any
other shock other than the global bond yield. But does it tell us that integration was high, or just
that yields had little variance? I wonder. I think these caveats should be included, and better still
something should be down about the second point above, if possible (this was another way making
my ”heteroskedasticity” argument from round 1.
I am very sympathetic to the Referee’s continued interest in the subtleties of the principal
component analysis (PCA). Here the Referee warns us again that high comovement of returns is
not necessarily a synonym of high integration. The Referee conjectures that during the Bretton
Woods there were not many shocks and (or as the result) the yields had little variance for all/most
countries at the same time. Consequently, there is a lot of commonality in yields which is captured
by the 1st component. This is reminiscent to the warning of Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), which I
mention in the paper, that two completely closed economies whose interest rates are the same by
chance (or due to similar endowments or policies) may look “highly integrated.” My response to
Obstfeld and Taylor was to argue that over the very long, such as 100+ years, run such “coincidence”
is not likely.
However it might be possible over the shorter interval, maybe a decade of the 1960s, as Referee
argues. To address such concern, I would like to point out that according to the descriptive
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statistics of the return data presented in Table 1 of the manuscript the Bretton Woods period
was not exceptional (compared to, for example, the Gold Standard) in terms of low volatility of
interest rates, measured by average standard deviation of returns, average cross-sectional standard
deviation, or the coefficient of variation. Furthermore, the relatively high level of integration
is observed only in the late 1960s, close or on the verge of the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system which fell precisely because governments were unable or unwilling to tame trade flows and
associated with them flows of capital. I appeal to the evidence by Eichengreen (1996) and Krugman
and Obstfeld (2009) on the matter, which I also cite.
To further address the Referee’s comment about what is going on in 1960s one can proceed in
two ways.
1. Follow the invitation of the Referee and explore the higher-order components. Then, we
would like to find the interpretation of the 2nd component, and try to relate it to some
shocks, policies, etc., in the attempt to rationalize the “unusually high” integration in the
1960s. Could 2nd component, for example, capture the low variance of yields in that period
due to absence of shocks?
2. Admit that the 1960s are “different” in some respect and try to explore if the pattern of the
1st component changes in the regression framework of Section 6 when we control for the key
features of the Bretton Woods arrangement.
In the current manuscript, I am more inclined to pursue the strategy No. 2. The reason is the
great difficulty to convincingly find the compelling interpretation of the higher order components
explaining the relatively low proportion of overall variation in similar economic series. This is the
reason the macro and international finance literature did not extensively employ the method of
principal components. The most prominent recent papers on integration touching upon the PCA
method, most notably Mauro et al. (2002) and Bordo and Murshid (2006), hardly provide any
interpretation to the principal components. I try improve on this void by providing evidence for
the interpretation of 1st component in interest rate data (the first component is the unobserved
“world rate”). As I argue in this paper, the first component has a clear theory-based interpretation
consistent with the standard no-arbitrage theory. The empirical result shows a single component
with larger variance captures the dynamics that is informative of the extent of market integration.
In addition, in my paper I develop two “indices of segmentation” (based on individual countries’
loadings on the 1st component) and explore dynamic correlations of individual returns with this
“world return.” These additional tests, presented in Section 6.1, explore country- or group-specific
shocks in the way which does not require higher-order components.
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Nevertheless, I decided to pursue the route of the higher-order components in a separate paper,
duly noting the possibility of such approach in the second revision of the current manuscript. In
this note, I would like to offer the results of some preliminary explorations regarding the 2nd
component, paying particular attention to the Bretton Woods period.
I. Let me first clarify that it is not necessarily the case that “if the variance of the 2nd component
goes DOWN, the % explained by the first will go UP by construction”—the other (3rd, 4th)
component’s proportion may change. In the PCA, if the proportion of total variation explained
by a higher-order principal component goes up, the proportion due to the lower order components
combined should go down by construction. This is because the components are orthogonal to each
other, and each subsequent component explains (a part of) the residual variation in the original
series. To verify this intuition, I extracted first 3 components in my bond return series, and
computed the dynamic proportion explained by each one. Figure 1 of this note presents the result.
There are several moments to note.
1. The proportion of common variation in returns explained by the 2nd component never gets
larger than 0.2, and for the 3rd component—than 0.1. The proportion due to 3rd compo-
nent is fairly small to be considered informative. The 2nd component arguably bears some
information.
2. The proportion due to the 2nd component is fairly flat in 1960s–1970s. As I argue above,
the drastic upward trend in the 1st component (my index of integration) must be associated
with the fall in the proportion due to all higher-order components combined.
II. Next and similarly to the approach in Section 6.1, I compute the country loadings on the
2nd principal component, and recover correlations of the 2nd component with country returns.
Explorations of these loadings may help form hypotheses about the meaning of this component.
The dynamics of the correlations are reported in Figure 2 of this note, the Bretton Woods period
is the shaded areas on each graph. We observe the following
1. Overall, the correlations of individual returns with the 2nd component are very noisy com-
pared to the correlations with the 1st component (see Figure 5 in the manuscript). Therefore,
it is hard to assign the 2nd component to a single or group of countries (country or group
effects) or to some particular monetary arrangement (specific policy or shocks during the
Bretton Woods, for example).
2. If the Bretton Woods saw the “coincidentally” calm interest rates in all countries we would
not see high loadings on 2nd component for most countries. While we observe some clustering
4
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of high loadings 1960s for France, Germany, and Italy; or in the late 1940 for Norway, Sweden
and Spain it is hard to generalize from these patterns.
The evidence so far does not seem to suggest that the high value of the index of integration in
the late Bretton Woods was coincidental due few shocks or the most yields having little variance.
Unfortunately, the 2nd component does not seem to help to explore this argument further, mostly
because it is hard to find the interpretation of this component. I will devote a separate paper to
this issue.
For this reason, in the second revision I chose to focus on the Strategy No. 2 and control for the
unobserved characteristics of the Bretton Woods period in the regression framework. Specifically,
I include the Bretton Woods period dummy (taking the value of 1 in the period 1945:06–1971:07,
and 0 otherwise, using the timing from Bordo and Schwartz, 1999) in the multiple regressions as
in Table 4 of the 1st revision. I think the results became even more informative with this addition,
and I must reiterate my gratitude to the Referee for his/her comments. These issues are duly noted
and discussed in Section 6.2 of the current version.
I reproduce a part of this table here for monthly data as Table 1. The key finding is high
comovement of returns during the Bretton Woods period, as indicated by positive significance of
the dummy. With Bretton Woods dummy, the coefficient to the unexplained Country Risk falls
on absolute value, which implies that that variable partially captured the phenomenon of Bretton
Woods. The other new result worth mentioning is weak negative significance of the fiscal policy
variable, which is what we would expect in theory. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the dummy
eliminates the significance of the variable Prevalence of Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes because the
majority of such regimes was observed exactly during the Bretton Woods era of fixed exchange rate
regime centered around the U.S. dollar. The significance of other variables were not affected. Most
importantly, the U-shape long-run pattern of integration survives conditional on all the controls,
including the Bretton Woods period dummy. If anything, it gains in the statistical significance.
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Figure 1:
Proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd principal components (smoothed series)
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Notes: Estimates of the proportion of variation in bond returns explained by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd principal component
smoothed using the uniformly weighted moving average smoother. Government bond returns are in levels. In-sample
countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and United States. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window with the bandwidth
of 156 months.
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Figure 2: Country-specific effects. The correlations of individual returns with the 2nd principal
component, 1875–2002
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Notes: For detailed notes see the continuation of this figure on the following page.
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Notes: Correlations of individual returns with the 2nd principal component. The correlation between an observed
returns and unobserved first principal component is computed as explained in Section ??. The extraction of the 1st
principal component is performed for the sample of 11 countries using centered moving window time sub-sample with
156 months bandwidth. In-sample countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Table 1: Determinants of bond markets integration. Time-series regressions, 1875–2002
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Index of Integration
Type of data Monthly
Time Trend –.237+ –.266*
(.152) (.151)
Time Trend2 .215** .190*
(.104) (.099)
Average Trade .326*** .456***
Openness (.122) (.118)
Average Annual –.020*** –.025***
Inflation Rate (.007) (.007)
Average Government –.024 –.533+
Deficit (.346) (.333)
Prevalence of Pegged .147*** –.000
Exchange Rate Regimes (.031) (.042)
Prevalence of .037 –.068+
Capital Controls (.034) (.043)
Hyperinflation Years –.064*** –.076***
(.024) (.023)
Prevalence of .046 .062+
Financial Crises (.044) (.038)
Prevalence of .023 .025
Consumption Disasters (.064) (.064)
Average Country Risk –.234*** –.199***
(.061) (.061)
World Wars .096** .164***
(.049) (.047)
Bretton Woods Period .171***
(.039)
Observations 1416 1416
Lags Included 6 6
F-stat 44.23 58.20
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** , **, *, and † denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%
levels. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to the lag order shown in the
table. Index of Integration is the estimate of the proportion of variation in the group of 11 bond returns explained
by the first principal component. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window with
the bandwidth of 156 months. Time period is chosen to always have 156 month of data to estimate the dependent
variable. In-sample countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States. The estimation of the component is performed as the centered rolling window
with the bandwidth of 156 months. Average Country Risk is the average across in-sample countries of the bond spread
versus the estimate “world” return. The “world” return is the first principal component of country bond returns.
“Prevalence of X” denotes a fraction of countries where X occurs in a given time period. “Bretton Woods Period”
is the binary variable taking the value of 1 in the period 1945:06–1971:07, and 0 otherwise. See Data Appendix for
detailed definitions of the variables. Quarterly and yearly data uses the corresponding averages of the monthly data.
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